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ABSTRACT. This paper presents a meta-analysis of variations in price and income elasticities of
residential water demand.  Information on the determinants of consumer demand is of pivotal
importance for the efficiency and efficacy of public and private policy-making.  It is also crucial for
effective water demand management.  We focus on the application of statistical methods to
synthesize research results on price and income elasticities of residential water demand reported in
the literature.  These techniques are generally referred to as meta-analysis.  This type of analysis
constitutes an adequate tool for explaining why empirical estimates of the price and income elasticity
of residential water demand vary to such considerable extents.  The set of explanatory factors used in
the meta-analysis includes variables derived from microeconomic choice theory and moderator
variables reflecting differences in spatial and temporal dynamics, research design, and statistical
quality of the estimates of previously published studies.
JEL: D11, D12, H31, Q25, Q28
KEYWORDS: water demand, price elasticity, income elasticity, meta-analysis
21. INTRODUCTION
Water is increasingly viewed as a scarce commodity.  It is a resource that, due to its value and
relevance for (human) life and the earth’s ecosystem, should be positioned in the center of public and
private interest.  Typically there are two different types of policy responses to the water scarcity
problem.  One is supply-oriented and focuses on the exploitation of new resources and expansion of
the network infrastructure.  Supply-oriented policies have been the standard response to water
scarcity for a long time, and are currently still prevailing in many areas in the world.  They are
basically driven by the notion that water is a necessary commodity.  The other approach is demand-
oriented and focuses on the development of water conservation and management programs to
influence water demand and water use sustainability.  Demand-driven solutions are increasingly
viewed as a necessary complement to, or even substitute for, supply-oriented policy measures.  Water
conservation and demand management programs include fostering the adoption of water-saving
appliances, awareness campaigns, eco-labeling, and price and taxation measures.  Each program
obviously differs in terms of costs and benefits.
A proper cost-benefit assessment of sustainable water use programs is only feasible on the
basis of a thorough understanding of consumer responses to price and income changes.  Detailed
knowledge about price and income elasticities of residential water demand, describing the behavioral
responses of consumers, is available through a substantial number of empirical studies.  However, the
empirical estimates cover a sizeable range of values.  Price elasticity estimates vary between –7.5 and
+7.9, and income elasticities cover a smaller but still considerable range between –.9 and +7.8.  The
large absolute values of the elasticities are surprising, because there are compelling reasons for the
expectation of relatively small values.  For instance, in some water management jurisdictions prices
may be so low that a surcharge on the price of water hardly affects the quantity demanded.  Similarly,
the consumers’ need for a minimum subsistence level of water, or the consumers’ unawareness of the
cost of water, may cause price and income elasticities to be close to zero (OECD 1999).  Low
elasticities obviously will seriously hamper the success of policies for demand management.
Potentially important determinants of price and income elasticities are differences in tariffs
across water management jurisdictions.  It is specifically relevant to consider differences in the
design of tariff systems.  Usually, price setting behavior of water companies is severely restricted by
a highly politicized decision process.  Tariffs are oftentimes required to satisfy both certain
efficiency and equity requirements: the allocation among different users is required to be “fair” and,
at the same time, misallocation of water among different users or different purposes should be
avoided.  In the context of decision-making on tariff schemes a non-negligible trade-off between
efficiency and equity aspects of water allocation thus exists.
Additional complications in policy-making may result from apparent trade-offs between
interfering policy programs.  For instance, a demand management program evoking lower water
3consumption induced by increasing tariffs may de facto result n a rise in real income.  In the case of
a positive income elasticity of water demand this implies a concurrent increase in water demand,
which may be at odds with a sustainable water use program.
These observations illustrate that the allocation of water resources and the design of demand
management policies aimed at sustainable water use, are non-trivial issues.  We therefore set out to
detect the main factors explaining the variation in estimated price and income elasticities of
residential water demand by means of statistical techniques.  Meta-analysis, constituting a specific
set of tools developed primarily in the experimental sciences, is best tailored to analyze the research
results obtained in different studies.
In doing so we follow up on earlier work by Espey et al. (1997), although our approach
differs in three important ways.  First, instead of the nonlinear specification used by Espey et al. we
use a straightforward linear model specification.  This is evidently much simpler but the results are
strikingly different and we attain substantially more explanatory power.  Second, the set of studies
we consider is significantly larger and we extend the focus of the analysis to include income
elasticities in addition to the price elasticities considered by Espey et al. (1997).  Finally, we
explicitly investigate the relevance of explanatory variables derived from microeconomic theory on
kinked demand curves.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical micro-economic
background of water demand studies, and discusses a number of salient econometric issues.  In
Section 3 we introduce meta-analysis and explain its suitability to analyze the empirical literature.
Section 4 confers the principles behind study retrieval, and explores the variation in reported
elasticity estimates according to various dimensions (such as data type and specification used, tariff
system, publication outlet, and spatial and temporal variation).  Section 5 presents the results of a
meta-regression analysis.  Section 6 contains conclusions and policy implications of the analysis.
2. THEORY AND ECONOMETRIC BACKGROUND
In the case of complex tariff systems, the microeconomics of water demand is more complex than in
the case of constant per unit prices.  Because of the current predominance of complex tariff systems
in many countries (Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; OECD 1999) we outline the theoretical and
econometric implications of quantity dependent price setting behavior of water suppliers.
Specifically, we are interested in the implications of microeconomic theory and the related
econometrics on estimated price and income elasticities.  We derive several implications to be
investigated in the meta-analysis.
42.1 Implications of block rate pricing for the demand of water
Subsistence requirements and merit arguments are frequently used to argue in favor of a tariff system
for public utilities, such as water, gas, electricity, and sometimes telecommunications, for which
prices depend on the quantity consumed.  For such complex tariff systems three main categories can
be distinguished, depending on whether the price per unit is constant (‘constant unit pricing’); the
price is constant within discrete intervals of use, but increasing between different intervals
(‘increasing block rate pricing’); or a system equivalent to the former, but with decreasing prices
between intervals (‘decreasing block rate pricing’).  These tariff systems are often applied in
conjunction with a fixed fee.  For reasons of tractability, but without further implications for the
analysis, the fixed fee is assumed to be zero from here on.
The consequences for the analysis of an individual’s demand under such complex tariff
systems are far reaching, because increasing or decreasing block rate pricing result in the violation of
a standard assumption of the standard theory of consumer demand.  In the case of constant unit
pricing, consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint based on an exogenously
determined (average and marginal) price that is independent of the quantity (previously) consumed.
If (average and marginal) prices depend on actual use, however, the micro-economic choice problem
is complicated by the presence of a kinked rather than a linear budget curve (Moffit 1986; Rietveld et
al. 1997).
Figure 1 illustrates the consequences of the presence of increasing block rate tariffs.  In this
Figure, we assume three consumers (labeled A, B, and C) with identical income but different
preferences.  On the horizontal axis the water quantity demanded is represented (labeled x1).  The
vertical axis gives the quantity demanded of a composite of other goods (labeled x2).  For amounts of
water less than b a low price of lp1 per unit has to be paid, while for amounts consumed in excess of
b, consumers pay a high price of hp1 per unit.  Consumer C ha  a relatively strong preference for
water, whereas consumer A has a elatively strong preference for other goods, as illustrated by the
three iso-utility curves in Figure 1.  The kinked budget curve in Figure 1 depicts all possible
combinations of goods that can be bought if all available income is spent on goods.  Figure 1 shows
that, depending on preferences, different consumers can face different average and marginal prices
and thus react differently to price changes.  In addition, consumers in the first block are unaffected
by price changes in the second block.  The price elasticity of demand can therefore well be zero for
some consumers if only prices in the second block are affected by price reforms.  Likewise, it is easy
to show that consumers with different incomes, but similar preferences, may fall in different blocks
and hence face different average and marginal prices.  More specifically, in the case depicted in
Figure 1 consumers with a relatively high income will face relatively high average and marginal
prices, and vice versa.
5There have been various attempts to model residential water demand (see, for example,
Terza and Welch 1982).  The most common way is to take preferences into account in order to
determine the relevant block where consumption takes place.  In formal terms, the consequences of
the presence of a block rate system for the price and income elasticities of demand can be seen as
follows.  For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume a Stone-Geary utility
function.  This is similar to a Cobb-Douglas utility function, except for the allowance of subsistence
requirements.  Without loss of generality, we assume a subsistence requirement 1x for good 1 only.
The price in the first and second block is labeled lp1 a
hp1, respectively.  The subsistence
requirement is bought against lp1 (so bx <1 ).  Furthermore, y is consumer’s income, and after b
units of water the consumer pays hp1 per unit.  The consumer’s maximization problem can then
straightforwardly be described as:
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Following Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976), a difference variable d can b def ned that amounts to
the difference in total consumer’s expenditure for the situation in which the maximum amount of
water consumed is charged fully at the marginal rate as compared to the situation where the
maximum amount of water in the first block is charged at the price applicable in the first block.  In
the case of decreasing (increasing) block rates, the difference variable can be defined as a lump-sum
subsidy (tax).  The sum of the difference variable and income gives a measure of ‘virtual’ income
that is convenient when solving the optimization problem of a consumer consuming in the second
block (Corral et al. 1998).  In the above case, the value of the difference variable in the first block
equals:
bppd lh )( 11 -= (2)
In order to derive the demand functions as well as price and income elasticities of demand,
we impose a specific structure on the price scheme for the first good by assuming 111 apapp
hl º= .
The difference variable is thus equal to (1-a)bp1.  The par me er a indicates the structure of the tariff
system, with a = 1 implying a constant block rate tariff, a > 1 a decreasing block rate tariff, and a < 1
an increasing block rate tariff.  For a = 0, there is a free allowance; that is, amounts consumed below
b are distributed for free.  The demand function can be derived in a straightforward way for the three
different cases.1
                                                      
1 Detailed analytical results are available from the authors upon request.
6In the case of a constant block rate tariff ( = 1) the demand for good 1 is given by:
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This expression reveals that consumers consume their subsistence requirement plus a weighted share
of the income that is left after the subsistence requirement has been paid for, with the weight being
equal to 1/pa .
The demand function becomes more complex in the case of increasing block rate tariffs (a <
1).  It consists of three parts:
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For relatively low income levels (below y-) the fir t lock applies, whereas for relatively high income
levels (exceeding y+) the second block is relevant.  At intermediate ranges of income, the consumer
demands an amount of the first good equal to the amount where the tariff changes.  In this range, all
additional income is spent on the second good.  In other words, the relatively high price of water in
the second block prevents the consumer from consuming water in this block over some range of his
income.
Finally, in the presence of decreasing block rates (a > 1), we obtain:
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Consumers consume in the first block up to a specific level of income y*.2 At the income level y*,
where water consumption is less than b, a ‘jump’ to the second block occurs where prices for the first
good are relatively low and consumption is in excess of b.
                                                      
2 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explicitly derive the critical income level y* at which the consume  jumps
from the first to the second block.  Instead, we focus on the intuition and implications of this result.  Analytical
details are available upon request.
7Price and income elasticities for the demand for good 1 (water) can now straightforwardly be
derived.  Note that the price elasticity is defined as the effect on the demand of an equal percentage
increase of the price in both the first and the second block.  Consequences of changes in the tariff
structure are hence not explicitly addressed, but can be straightforwardly derived.  For the constant
block rate case, the price and income elasticity is derived as:
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Note that due to the presence of a subsistence requirement, the (absolute value of the) price elasticity
is less than one.  It converges to one if income approaches infinity.  This reflects the fact that a
Stone-Geary utility function approximates the Cobb-Douglas case with unitary income and price
elasticities if income approaches infinity (for example, De Groot 1998).
In the case of incr asing block rates, the elasticities are equal to:
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Two results are noteworthy here.  First, there is a range of income over which consumers do not
respond to price and income changes.  Over this range, they consume an amount of water equal to b
and spend any additional income on the composite good.  Second, even in the absence of subsistence
requirements, the elasticities are non-constant due to the presence of block rates when income
exceeds y+.  In absolute terms, the elasticities do not exceed unity.
Finally, in the presence of decreasing block rates, the elasticities are equal to:
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8Note here that since a > 1, th price and income elasticities can — in absolute terms — exceed unity
if )1()1(1 babbx --< .
The results of this analysis for the demand and the price and income elasticity as a function
of income are illustrated in Figure 2.  The key results to be inferred from this analysis, which are
particularly relevant for the subsequent meta-analysis, can be summarized as follows.
1. In the presence of subsistence requirements, price and income elasticities are non-constant.  Price
(and income) elasticities tend to increase (in absolute terms) with income for goods with
relatively high subsistence requirements.
2. In the presence of block rate pricing, price and income elasticities are non-constant and
discontinuous.  This is due to the fact that consumers are confronted with ‘jumps’ in the marginal
prices they face.
3. With increasing block rate tariffs income ranges exist at which the demand of consumers for a
good characterized by block rates is unaffected by price and income changes.
4. With decreasing block rate tariffs, there exists an income level at which consumers ‘jump’ from
the first to the second block, and hence demand is discontinuous.
An important implication of these conclusions for the subsequent analysis is that the average
responsiveness of consumers in an analysis of individual (or household) observations depends on the
distribution of income levels relative to the location of the consumption levels at which tariffs
change.  Therefore, significant differences between elasticities derived under control for income
differences and ‘uncontrolled’ elasticities are expected.  Figure 2 also shows that, ceteris paribus, the
absolute value of price and income elasticities should be smaller or equal (greater or equal) when
comparing decreasing (increasing) tariff systems to the flat tariff rate system.  Although this
analytical result holds in an experimental ceteris paribus ett ng, it may not necessarily show up in a
meta-analysis comparing elasticities among different studies, due to the occurrence of unobserved
non-random differences.
2.2 Econometric aspects of water demand models
Water demand models have been estimated since the 1950s.  The first study dates back to 1951 (see
Baumann et al. 1998). Most studies are concerned with the price elasticity of residential water
demand.  A considerably smaller set of studies deals with the income elasticity.  Two econometric
issues of paramount importance have attained considerable attention in this literature.  One is
concerned with an adequate specification of the price in water demand models.  The discussion
focused on the adequacy of using the average or the marginal price.  The other is related to the
prevalence of block rate pricing.  Specifically, it addresses the implications of block rate pricing for
9the functional specification of the model.  We briefly discuss both issues, concentrating on the
consequences involved for the meta-analysis.
Howe and Linaweaver (1967) set the stage for a discussion on the relevance of average and
marginal prices for the demand model specification by arguing that consumers react to marginal
rather than average prices.  Many recent studies include either the average price (Billings 1990;
Hogarty et al. 1975), the marginal price (Danielson 1979; Lymann 1992), or b th (Opa uch 82,
1984; Martin et al. 1992).  Shin (1985) started using the so-called ‘perceived price’, which is usually
a combination of marginal and average prices.  Perceived prices have subsequently been used in
other studies as well (Nieswiadomy 1992).
Concurrent work on electricity demand (Taylor 1975; Nordin 1976) provided compelling
evidence that the specification should be extended with a difference variable accounting for the
(implicit) lump sum transfers caused by the existence of block rates (see the preceding section).
These water demand studies include a difference variable in addition to the marginal price
(Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989).
Most studies, however, do not explicitly model the consumers’ position on the demand
curve, and hence ignore the specification of the block rate relevant to the consumer.  Hewitt and
Hanemann (1995) suggest using the so-called ‘two-error model’, originally developed in the labor
supply literature, to circumvent the misspecification bias due to this omission.  The first error term is
intended to capture factors influencing the utility function, i.e., the ‘heterogeneity error’, and the
second error term is supposed to cover the difference between the optimal and the observed level of
water demand, i.e., the ‘optimization error’.  As a consequence, the heterogeneity error determines
the discrete choice (in this case, the conditional demand or, more precise, the block in which
consumption takes place), and the optimization error accounts for the difference between the
observed value and the value determined by the maximization of the utility function.  The observed
demand of water is thus modeled as the outcome of a discrete choice and a perception error that,
dependent on the magnitude, places the consumption in a different block.  A small number of studies
using this approach show relatively high absolute values for the price elasticity, suggesting that
reactions to price changes are elastic rather than inelastic.  Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), for
instance, report price elasticity estimates of approximately –1.5 for the US, and Rietveld et al.
(1997), using the same approach, find a price elasticity of –1.2 for Indonesia.  Estimated income
elasticities using the discrete-continuous choice approach are generally inelastic, and hence more in
line with values reported in other studies.
We can infer three observations from the ab ve discussion of the econometric aspects of
water demand models.  First, the variation in estimated elasticity values may be partly caused by
differences in the nature of the price used in the specification (average and/or marginal prices, or the
Shin approach).  Second, the inclusion of a difference variable is a potential cause for observed
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differences in estimated elasticity values.  Finally, including the consumer’s position on the demand
curve, following the Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) suggestion, avoids misspecification bias and can
potentially result in significantly different elasticity estimates.
3. META-ANALYSIS
The estimates of price and income elasticities of water demand reported in the literature reveal a
rather scattered pattern over a substantial range of values (Baumann et al. 1998).  The estimates can
be retrieved from an impressive amount of studies that differ according to a plethora of dimensions.
The studies show considerable heterogeneity in terms of tariff structure, model specification
(functional form, definition of explanatory variables, estimator), type of data (frequency of
observation, time series, cross section or panel data), number of observations, and publication status
(published or unpublished, and publication outlet).  For the explanation of the structural variation in
estimates of price and income elasticities of water demand from different studies, meta-analysis is an
adequate tool.
Meta-analysis has been developed in the context of (social) sciences based on an
experimental methodology, mainly medicine, psychology, marketing, and education.  Meta-analysis
is a well-defined term and refers to the statistical analysis of empirical research results of studies
performed previously.  It can be distinguished from primary and secondary analysis (Glass 1976),
referring to an original and an extended investigation of a data set, respectively, because meta-
analysis uses aggregate data derived from previous research results and consequently exploits several
differing data sets.  In meta-analysis effect size measures are used as the inputs of the analysis.
Typically, effect size indicators are defined as standardized mean differences, probabilities, or
correlations.  In economics (standardized) regression coefficients and elasticities are often used (Van
den Bergh et al. 1997).  In the context of meta-analysis, a toolbox of statistical techniques has been
developed, covered in sufficient detail in, for instance, Hedges and Olkin (1985), and Cooper and
Hedges (1994).  In various subdisciplines of economics, meta-analysis has recently gained ground,
for instance in industrial economics (Button and Weyman-Jones 1992), labor economics (Jarrell and
Stanley 1990; Card and Krueger 1995; Ashenfelter et al. 1999), and transport economics (Button and
Kerr 1996).  Especially in environmental economics, stimulated by the work of Smith (1989; see also
Smith and Kaoru 1990a,b; Smith and Osborne 1996) many meta-analyses appeared.
Despite these developments, economists still largely rely on narrative state-of-the-art
reviews, eventually extended with graphs and tabulations.  Although reviews are valuable in their
own right, there are a number of disadvantages in solely relying on surveys of the literature.  Most
literature reviews are implicitly based on some sort of vote-counting technique.  Vote-counting
essentially boils down to counting the number of significantly positive, significantly negative, and
11
insignificant results.  The results are simply tallied, and the category with the plurality of cases is
usually taken to reveal the true characteristics of the underlying population.  However, Hedges and
Olkin (1985) point out that this procedure contains a fatal flaw, because it tends to lead to making the
wrong inference when the number of underlying studies increases.  The statistical cause for this
rather counterintuitive result is that the Type-II errors of each of the underlying studies do not cancel
out.
In addition, the crudity of the comparative procedure used in vote-counting techniques is also
unsatisfactory.  Statistical significance alone is insufficient to determine whether the results of
different studies agree (Hedges 1997).  The difference in magnitude of the coefficients found in the
literature should obviously be taken into account as well.  Moreover, the results of an empirical study
may provide a reasonable estimate of the sampling uncertainty of results, but non-sampling issues
such as research design, model specification and estimation techniques, are usually relatively
constant within a study (Hedges 1997).  Meta-analysis, in which non-sampling characteristics can be
taken into account as moderator variables, constitutes an attractive technique to synthesize research
results.  In our case, focusing on the analysis of empirical water demand research, this assertion is
particularly relevant given the abovementioned differences in handling price information and the
effects of block rate price setting as well as the huge variety in non-sampling characteristics of the
studies.
4. DATA RETRIEVAL AND EXPLORATORY META-ANALYSIS
A crucial factor determining the validity and the extent to which results of a meta-analysis can be
generalized is the thoroughness and completeness of the literature retrieval.  A common
misperception is that the overview should be comprehensive.  Comprehensive coverage, however, is
not necessary as long as the included studies are representative of the population.  Common
desiderata in literature retrieval are a high recall and a high precision.  Recall is defined as the ratio of
relevant documents retrieved to those in a collection that should be retrieved.  Precision is defined as
the ratio of documents retrieved and judged relevant to all those actually retrieved.  Unfortunately,
precision and recall tend to vary inversely (White 1994).  Most researchers favor high precision, but
in the context of a meta-analysis high recall is the more relevant desideratum.
The collection procedure used in this study focuses on high recall.  As a starting point we
exploited readily available literature reviews (Hewitt 1993; Baumann et al. 1998; OECD 1998, 1999)
and the meta-analysis of Espey et al. (1997).  Additional studies were generated by ‘reference
chasing’, and several authors were contacted by E-mail in order to acquire further published or
unpublished results, including (unpublished) research memoranda.  In addition, we extensively used
more modern methods of literature retrieval, such as browsing Internet databases, in particular
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EconLit.3  We also tried to find unpublished studies and research memoranda, up until 1998, through
a search in NetEc, RepEc, and websites of renowned universities and research institutes (for instance,
CEPR, NBER, etc.).4
On the basis of this retrieval procedure 50 studies were gathered, from which we derived 268
price elasticity estimates and 149 income elasticity estimates of water demand.  In addition we
collected and codified auxiliary information on statistical sample characteristics and research design.
Our sample is considerably larger than the concurrent sample of 124 price elasticities forming the
basis of the Espey et al. (1997) meta-analysis, and it also contains the innovative work on two-error
models by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Rietveld et al. (1997).  Table 1 presents an exhaustive
overview of the studies contained in the meta-sample and summarizes the main dimensions of
variation among the studies, including the (range of) value(s) of the elasticity estimates.  We
deliberately use the variations among studies to explore the extent to which they result in
significantly differing elasticity estimates, and include variations in patio-temporal focus, research
design, methodology, and tariff structure in the explanatory meta-analysis.5
Table 1A and B show the existence of a long-term research practice with respect to
residential water demand.  The time coverage of the studies follows a well-distributed pattern, but
over space a pervasive bias towards the US can be observed.  Most studies are concerned with the
estimation of short run elasticities, but show considerable variation in terms of the type of price used.
Since the 1980s most studies include a difference variable, but the discrete-continuous methodology
is only used in three studies.  An important complication in assessing the impact of different tariff
systems on estimated elasticity values is also apparent from Table 1.  For many studies information
on the nature of the tariff system (i.e., flat, increasing, or decreasing) cannot be obtained.  Below we
explore the variation in estimated elasticity values according to most of the dimensions distinguished
in Table 1.
Figure 3 shows the meta-sample distributions for price and income elasticities, ordered
according to magnitude.  The distribution of price elasticities has a sample mean of  –.43, a median
of –.35, and a standard deviation of .92.  The minimum and maximum values in the sample are –7.47
and 7.90, respectively.  In line with theoretical expectations most estimates are negative.  However,
the number of estimates deviating from –1 is considerably larger for estimates greater than –1 than
                                                      
3 EconLit (http://www.econlit.org/) is a comprehensive, indexed bibliography with selected abstracts of the
world’s economic literature, produced by the American Economic Association.  It includes coverage of over 400
major journals as well as articles in collective volumes (essays, proceedings, etc.), books, book reviews,
dissertations, and working papers licensed from the Cambridge University Press Abstracts of Working Papers in
Economics.
4 NetEc includes BibEc,WoPEc, and WebEc (http://netec.wustl.edu).  For RepEc s e http://www.repec.org.
5 The database is available at http://www.econ.vu.nl/re/master-point under the heading ‘downloadable files.’
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for those smaller than –1, yielding the conclusion that there is substantial evidence for water demand
being price inelastic.
The distribution of income elasticities has a mean of .46 and a median of .28, but the range of
values is considerably smaller than for the price elasticities (standard deviation .81).   Approximately
10 percent of the estimates is greater than 1 and hence, again corroborating theoretical expectations,
water demand appears to be inelastic in terms of income changes.
In what follows we have excluded two outliers in the price elasticity sample, the extreme
values –7.47 and 7.90 mentioned above.  Their inclusion would have a disproportional influence on
the quantitative analysis, in particular because a dummy variable for segment elasticities (of which
these observations are a sub-sample) would not adequately pick up these extreme values given their
opposite sign.  In addition, we excluded the positive elasticities in the price elasticity sample because
of their ‘perverse’ nature.  On the basis of a one-sided test of the elasticity being significantly smaller
than zero inclusion of these estimates would have to be based on the theoretically absurd acceptance
of the null hypothesis of non-negative price elasticities (see also Figure 4).6  As a consequence th
size of the sample for price elasticity reduces to 250 observations.  From the income elasticities
sample one observation, a segment elasticity of -.86, is excluded because it cannot be included as a
separate category and at the same time does not really fit into the explanatory framework (comprising
factors such as functional form and estimator).  As a consequence the income elasticity sample
reduces to 148 observations.
Table 2 presents an ANOVA-type overview of the differences in means for price and income
elasticities with respect to the main microeconomic and methodological characteristics.  These
differences refer to the tariff structure (decreasing, flat, increasing), the type of price used to estimate
the elasticity (average, marginal or Shin), the use of a difference variable, and the application of the
two-error model.  We also distinguish between short and long run elasticities, and between point and
segment elasticities.
Table 2 shows that the conditional means of the price elasticities are rather homogeneous
according to the type of price variable used, although elasticities based on marginal prices are
significantly larger in absolute value than those based on fixed or average prices.  For increasing
block rate tariffs the average price elasticity is approximately .25 higher (in absolute value) as
compared to flat and decreasing tariff systems.  Among the latter no significant difference exists.
Long run and segment elasticities are .15 and .49 greater in absolute value than short run and point
price elasticities, respectively.  Conditioning on income and the inclusion of a difference variable
                                                      
6 This is in accordance with Espey et al. (1997).  In general it would be desirable to include probability values
for the elasticities in the analysis.  For many specifications this is, however, not possible because the standard
errors refer to the first derivative and there is not sufficient sample information available to determine the
standard errors of the elasticities.
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does, on average, not result in significantly different price elasticities, whereas price elasticities
estimated by means of the two-error model are .73 greater in absolute value.
For income elasticities a slightly different picture emerges as the only significant differences
result from the type of tariff system, the type of price variable used, and the long vs. short run
feature.  Elasticities in decreasing tariff systems are approximately 1.15 greater than those in
increasing and flat tariff systems.  Income elasticities based on marginal prices are .27 higher than
corresponding elasticities based on average prices, although the largest significant difference is
related to the use of Shin prices resulting in elasticities that are approximately 1.30 higher compared
to elasticities derived by means of other price variables.   Long run elasticities are .34 smaller than
short run income elasticities.
As mentioned in Section 2, a potential additional source of variation may be accordi g to
GDP per capita, which is used here as a rather crude proxy to account for income differences across
studies.7  However, the correlations with GDP per capita are small (.11 (p = .07) for pric el sticities
and .25 (p = .00) for income elasticities), although they are both significantly different from zero.
From Figure 4 it is ev dent that some segment elasticities, which are easily identified as they
are evaluated on the basis of one observation, constitute outliers.  Figure 4 further shows variation of
estimated elasticities with sample size.  As expected, the variation n the estimated valu s is inver-
sely proportional to sample size.  That is, for large sample sizes the range of estimated elasticities is
small, whereas for small sample size the range is large.  However, because the correlations between
the number of observations and the elasticity estimates are only .04 and -.001 (p = .57 and .99) for
price and income elasticities, respectively, there is no systematic sample-size-induced bias in
elasticity values reported in the literature.
There are of course many more potential sources of structural variation.8  A potentially
important dimension, given the growing awareness of water sustainability, is the occurrence of a time
trend in the elasticity estimates.  The correlation between elasticities and the midpoint of the sample
period in the underlying studies equals -.07 (p = .26) for price and .09 (p = .27) for income
elasticities, so there is no apparent time trend in the demand for water.  Geographically, price
                                                      
7 We have used additional databases to obtain non-sample information regarding GDP per capita (generally not
reported in the primary studies).  In principle, we used GDP per capita in constant US dollars of 1985 (using
Purchasing Power Parities) as reported in the Penn World Table (PWT), Mark 5.6 (available at
http://www.nber.org).  When the primary study covered more than one year, average GDP per capita was
determined for the period covered by the study.  For US States, additional information on GSP (Gross State
Product) per capita was obtained from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/data.htm.  By means of this source
an index of GSP per capita for States (or groups of States) relative to GDP per capita of the US (taken from the
same source) was constructed.  This index was subsequently multiplied with the information from the PWT to
attain comparable information on GDP per capita at the lowest achievable level of aggregation.  Details are
available upon request.
8 A full set of ANOVA results is available from the authors upon request.
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elasticities are significantly lower (.40, p = .00) in Eu ope and significantly higher (-.26, p = .09) in
other areas (Australia, Kuwait, Indonesia) compared to the US, whereas income elasticities are
homogeneous over space.
 Distinctions following the functional form merely show that linear specifications result in
lower mean absolute values of the price elasticity (.17, p = .01) as compared to the double-log form.
With respect to the type of estimator employed, only an occasional significant difference between
more elaborate estimators and simple OLS appears, in particular for Instrumental Variables in the
case of income elasticities.
There is substantial variation in terms of the type of data used in the primary studies,
resulting in various significantly different mean elasticity values.  For instance, the use of annual data
yields significantly lower absolute values of the price elasticities (.42, p = .00) as compared to da ly
data; there are no significant differences among income elasticities in this respect.  The use of cross
section data causes the absolute value of price elasticities to be significantly lower (.26, p = .02),
whereas the use of panel data leads to significantly greater (.34, p = .08) income elasticities; both as
compared to time series data.  Similarly, aggregate data in comparison to household data result in
substantially lower absolute values of the price elasticities (.22, p = .00), and they also lower the
mean of income elasticities (-.51, p = .00).  Of overriding importance is, however, the seasonal
feature of the data: the use of summer data as compared to year-round data leads to a significantly
more elastic price elasticity (-.52, p = .00), and the effect on income elasticities is even higher (1.46,
p = .00).
Regarding the publication source there appear to be some minor significant difference
among different publication outlets, but no significant difference among unpublished and published
studies exists.  Finally, a comparison of the Espey et al. data on price elasticities and the data we
added to their sample shows that the mean of the Espey et al. data is the same (the difference is .004,
p = .96).  This implies that at least in this respect there is no apparent difference in the re resen-
tativeness of the Espey et al. price elasticity sample and our extended sample.
5. META-REGRESSION
Exploratory results such as the above cannot be taken at face value because they merely pertain to
differences based on pairwise comparisons.  In order to attain a rigorous insight into the causes for
structural differences in estimated price and income variability of residential water demand, a
multivariate analysis is needed, taking into account the above dimensions of structural variation.
Espey et al. (1997) use a framework in which price elasticities of residential water demand are
explained as a function of the demand specification (including functional form and the specification
of the conditioning variables), data characteristics, environmental characteristics, and the
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econometric estimation technique.  Positive estimates for price elasticities are excluded, yielding a
sample of 124 observations, with a mean price elasticity of -.51 and about 90% of the estimates
between -.75 and 0.  Three meta-regressions are estimated using a linear, l glinear, and a Box-Cox
specification, respectively.9
A c2-test indicates that the nonlinear Box-Cox specification achieves the highest explanatory
power, and the results appear rather robust when comparing the signs and significance across the
three specifications.  In the nonlinear Box-Cox version of the model Espey et al. find that primary
studies in which the demand specification includes evapotransp rat on and rainfall variables, and
studies which are based on winter data (instead of summer or year-round data), reveal significantly
lower estimates of the price elasticity of residential water demand.  The main microeconomic
determinants (use of the average or Shin price in the demand equation, inclusion of a difference
variable,10 and increasing block rates) as well as the elasticity referring to the long run, and data
referring to commercial water use and the summer season, evoke significantly higher values for the
price elasticity of residential water demand.  In terms of magnitude, evapotranspira ion (-1.48), he
use of a difference variable (1.20), and summer data (1.28) seem to have the greatest impact.11
Following up on Espey et al.’s earlier work we investigate various issues in a meta-analysis
of price and income elasticities of residential water demand and report the results in different
subsections.  The first subsection deals with a re-analysis of the Espey et al. sample and our extended
sample providing evidence for the robustness of the results across studies.  Subsequent subsections
are confined to the use of our extended sample.  First, we elaborate on an alternative specification of
the meta-regression, and derive meta-analytical results for both price and income elasticities of
residential water demand.  Second, we present a more accurate way of investigating the impact of
                                                      
9 The Box-Cox transformation is restricted to the dependent variable (because the explanatory variables are all
dummy variables), transforming the dependent variable y to (yl-1)/l.  Exog ously fixing the value of l to 1
yields the linear form, 0 the semilog form, and 0 < l < 1 a general nonlinear form which can be estimated on the
basis of a grid search to find the highest value of the log-likelihood function.  It should be noted though that an
estimation procedure based on a grid search (as used by Espey et al.) does not necessarily provide maximum
likelihood estimates (see Greene 2000).  Because the natural logarithm is only defined for nonnegative values,
Espey et al. multiply the price elasticities with –1 for all specifications. The signs of the coefficients are thus
reversed.  We follow this approach in Table 3.  Subsequently, price elasticities are negatively defined.
10 Espey et al. (1997, p. 1371) refer to this as the difference price (or D price, for short), indicating the difference
between what the consumer would pay for water if all water were purchased at the marginal rate and what is
actually paid (Agthe and Billings 1980).  This is obviously notably different from the concepts of average,
marginal and Shin prices, the latter referring to Shin’s (1985) price perception model aimed at investigating
whether the consumer reacts to average or marginal prices by means of inclusion of a combination of the two
prices.  Because the difference price is strictly speaking not a price variable, but rather a correction factor
accounting for lump sum transfers in case of block rate tariffs, we prefer the labeling ‘difference variable’ over
‘difference price’.
11 Espey et al. (1997, p. 1372) rightfully point out that the binary feature of the explanatory variables precludes
interpreting the estimated coefficients as marginal values of the regre sors.
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differing tariff systems.  Finally, we succinctly investigate the implications of different micro-
economic behavioral models on observed price and income elasticities of residential water demand.
5.1 Robustness of results for price elasticities across different meta-samples
The Espey et al. sample contains 124 estimated price elasticities from 24 journal articles published
between 1967 and 1993, whereas our extended sample comprises 225 estimates from 50 studies that
appeared between 1963 and 1998.  In order to investigate the robustness of the results across studies
we compare the results of our sample to the Espey et al. results, using the Espey et al. specification.
Such a procedure should give an indication of the importance of sample selection bias.  The results
are presented in Table 3 for the linear and Box-Cox specifications.  The first four columns refer to
the Espey et al. sample, the last two to the extended sample.
The Espey et al. results presented in the first two columns of Table 3 (labeled “Original”) are
slightly different from those published in Espey et al. (1997).  Apparently there has been some
confusion in their coding of the variable referring to household level data, but the correction does not
have a substantial influence on their results.12  The estimations are based on a full maximum
likelihood procedure for all parameters including the transformation parameter l.  The Likelihood
Ratio test reported in Table 3 concerns the test of the Box-Cox model as unrestricted model against
the linear model containing the (implicit) restriction of l being equal to one.
The third and fourth column (labeled “Adjusted”) show the results for the Espey sample with
some additional adjustments to the coding of the data in order to make the data fully comparable to
the data set for the extended sample.  We substantially increased the number of observations for
which the type of tariff system is known (from 11 in the original Espey et al. sample to 53 in the
adjusted sample), using information regarding the estimated parameter value of the difference
variable.13  These changes affect the results substantially.  In particular, the explanatory power of the
specification is substantially less than in the original version: the adjusted R2 drops from .81 to .46.
The significance of almost half the variables changes drastically (from significant to insignificant, or
vice versa).  Regarding the microeconomic variables, decreasing block rates is now significantly
                                                      
12 In Table 2 of the Espey et al. study (1997, p. 1372) it is indicated that 28 observations refer to household data
and 96 to aggregate data.  This is, however not in accordance to their database, which gives 81 and 43
observations for household and aggregate data, respectively.  As the latter is equivalent to our own coding we
have used an accordingly coded dummy variable in replicating the Espey et al. analysis.  In addition, there seems
to be a slight mistake in Table 2 with respect to the figures 17 and 22 for ‘long run demand’ and ‘lagged
dependent variable’, which should be reversed.  This is, however, likely to be merely a typographical error.
13 A negative (positive) sign implies increasing (decreasing) block rates.  We also implemented two minor
changes: Denton, TX is coded as East rather than West (see Espey et al. 1997, p. 1371 for the criterion), and we
split the observations of Lyman (1992) more precisely according to season considered (summer, winter, or year-
round).
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different from zero in the Box-Cox specification, but the difference variable loses its significance in
both specifications.
The comparison of the last two columns of Table 3 with the middle two co umns gives an
indication of the robustness of the results across different meta-samples.  The extended meta-sample
is twice as large as the Espey et al. sample.  In terms of signs some noteworthy changes can be
observed.  For instance, the effect of the data type (daily data, and household level data) is reversed
in the extended sample.  Furthermore, with respect to the important microeconomic variables,
specifically decreasing block rates, average price, and Shin price we observe a reverse effect in terms
of significance.  The adjusted R2 drops even further to .23.  These changes reinforce the conclusion
that the literature retrieval process is of paramount importance, and also show that the estimation
results are not overly robust.  This is even more relevant as the fixed effects approach that
characterizes many meta-regressions, is particularly sensitive to the number of degrees of freedom
available — in terms of statistical significance as well as with regard to increasing the variation
available and limiting the degree of multicollinearity.
It should, however, also be noticed that there are some “peculiarities” in these specifications.
For instance, the omitted category for tariff systems includes both the cases for which no information
can be retrieved from the underlying studies as well as those that have a flat rate system; following
Section II it is expected that differences among studies are related to diverging income levels for the
respective areas being studied; and no formal distinction is being made for the relatively new studies
using the two-error model approach.14  W  will try to remedy by means of alternative specifications.
5.2 Alternative meta-specifications for price and income elasticities
In this section we introduce various adaptations to the econometric specification, and we also extend
the analysis to income elasticities of residential water demand.  The specification of the design
matrix we use in the meta-regressions includes variables from five different categories.
1. Following the discussion in Section II it can be assumed that considerations from microeconomic
theory and econometric methodology ma  be relevant.  We therefore include variables relating to
the type of tariff system (increasing and decreasing block rates, and a flat rate system vs. those
for which no information is available), the price variable (fixed, average, marginal, or Shin),
whether or not the elasticity is conditioned on income, and the modeling approach (inclusion of a
difference variable, and application of the discrete-continuous choice approach).  In addition
GDP per capita is used to account for income differences across studies (see footnote 6).  Finally,
short vs. long term, and point vs. segment elasticities are distinguished.
                                                      
14 The latter are not included in the Espey et al. (1997) sample.
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2. Spatio-temporal dynamics are investigated by means of including dummy variables related to
location (West US, East US, Europe and other countries vs. the US as the omitted category), and
the mid-point of the first and last year to which the data pertain.
3. Estimation characteristics of the underlying primary studies may affect the magnitude of the
estimated elasticities.  Therefore, information about the functional form (loglinear vs. other
functional forms), the conditioning variables used in the underlying studies (population density,
household size, seasonal dummy, evapotranspiration, rainfall, temperature, the lagged dependent
variable, and commercial use), and a variable indicating whether an estimator different from OLS
is used, are included in the set of explanatory variables of the meta-regression.
4. The potential influence of the type of data used is operationalized by means of the frequency of
observation (daily or monthly data vs. yearly data as the omitted category), the aggregation level
(individual or household data vs. aggregate data as the omitted category), and the type data series
(cross section or panel data vs. time series data as the omitted category).
5. Finally, we investigate whether there is a significant difference between the estimated elasticities
related to the publication status, by means of a dummy variable for unpublished studies.
With respect to the functional form of the meta-regression we believe that the use of a Box-Cox
transformation accounting for nonlinearities is not the appropriate solution to the nonlinear pattern
that can be observed in, for instance, Figure 4.  The main reason for what looks like a nonlinear
pattern is the statistical principle that estimates based on fewer observations are less efficient.
Consequently a Box-Cox transformation is likely to provide a good fit, but no substantive
explanatory power can be attached to it.  It merely replicates a statistical principle, and all estimates,
regardless of how precise they are, are given the same weight.  The real problem is that meta-
regressions are inherently heteroscedastic, as can also be seen from the Breusch-Pagan tests in Tables
4-6.  We therefore use a linear specification, and correct for heteroscedasticity by using White-
adjusted standard errors.
The estimation results for both price and income elasticities, with the variables grouped
according to the above categories, are presented in Table 4.  Since we do not use a Box-Cox
transformation the price elasticities have been defined on the usual interval
[-,0].15  Table 4 contains the results for the ‘Full Model’, as well as for a ‘Restricted Model’ in
which conditioning variables from the categories above (i.e., categories 2-5) that are not significantly
different from zero have been excluded using Th il’s (1971) backward stepwise elimination strategy.
It is remarkable that elasticities under block rate pricing are not significantly different from
those under a flat rate system.  From the other microeconomic variables it is only the positive effect
                                                      
15 Note that, as a consequence, the signs in this and the following Tables are reversed compared to Table 3.
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of the use of average prices on the absolute value of price elasticities, and the lowering impact of
income conditioning on income elasticities and of inclusion of the difference variable on price
elasticities, both in the restricted models, that are significantly different from zero.  Most pronounced
is, however, the effect of the two-error model.  The effect of long vs short run values conforms to
expectations, although the difference is only significant for price-elasticities.  The income elasticity
sample does not contain segment elasticities.  For the price elasticity sample they are significantly
higher.  Interesting is the effect of GDP per capita across studies: it is significantly negative for price
elasticities, indicating that price elasticities are generally smaller (i.e., more elastic) for higher
income countries.
Table 4 also shows that elasticities tend to be smaller in Europe as compared to the US, and
within the US price elasticities are greater in absolute value in the arid West of the US.  The latter
may be the result of water use for purposes that are expected to be more elastic, such as irrigation
(see also Espey et al. 1997).  From the estimation characteristics the climate related variables have a
systematic influence on the magnitude of the elasticities.  Some of the data characteristics are
significantly different from zero as well.  A final interesting result is that unpublished studies tend to
report smaller absolute values of the price elasticity, and greater income elasticity values.  The result
with respect to price elasticities contradicts the typical feature of publication bias: “exaggerated”
effects (in this case high absolute values of the elasticities) have a lower probability of being
published (Card and Krueger 1995; Ashenf lter et al. 1999).16
5.3 The impact of differing tariff systems
To more accurately assess the impact of differing tariff systems we re-estimated the specification
developed in the preceding section on a subset of the sample for which information on the tariff
structure is available.  The results are reported in Table 5.  For price elasticities we again used the
backward stepwise elimination strategy.  For income elasticities this is not feasible because of the
limited number of observations for which we have conclusive information about the rate structure.
With the number of observations being as low as 67, serious multicollinearity problems inflate
coefficient and standard error estimates.  For income elasticities we therefore report a “base case”
model, in which only the microeconomic variables are included.
The results show that the effects of the microeconomic variables are now much more
pronounced.  In particular increasing block rate pricing makes the demand for water more elastic, and
the income elasticity tends to be lower.  Decreasing block rate systems do not have a significant
effect.  The nexus of average and Shin prices increases the absolute value of the elasticities as
compared to marginal prices.  Inclusion of a difference variable and the specification of the demand
                                                      
16 Florax et al. (2001) provide a detailed discussion of publication bias, with numerical examples based on the
dataset used in this paper.
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for water as a discrete-continuous choice problem both have an effect, but only for income and price
elasticities, respectively.  The significant difference between short and long run elasticities
disappeared, but GDP per capita is now significantly different from zero for both price and income
elasticities.  Higher income areas tend to have higher price and income elasticities (in absolute
terms).  This result is generally consistent with theoretical predictions, as discussed in Section 2.
Except for an occasional case, the sign and significance of the control variables is similar to
those reported for the full sample.  The spatial variables are an exception though, because the results
for these variables are not very robust across different samples.  The sign for the arid West of the US
is now positive (demand is less elastic), but the greater price elasticities for Europe as compared to
the US contradict both the results for the larger sample (see Table 4) and the ANOVA results (see
Section 4).
5.4 The impact of differing microeconomic behavioral approaches
There is an important coincidence in which some of the microeconomic variables appear.  They
always occur in specific combinations, which may be viewed as different microeconomic behavioral
approaches to modeling residential water demand.  The following approaches can be distinguished:
1. The naïve approach that uses average or fixed prices without any conditioning on income, and
models demand as a continuous choice;
2. The conditional income approach that conditions for income differentials, uses either average or
fixed prices, or marginal or Shin prices, and models demand as a continuous choice;
3. The corrected conditional income approach that conditions for income differentials, uses
marginal or Shin prices, includes a difference variable, and models demand as a continuous
choice; and
4. The discrete-continuous choice approach that conditions for income differentials, uses marginal
prices, includes a difference variable, and models demand as a discrete-continuous choice.
As the specification of the above approaches is merely a regrouping of dummy variables used earlier,
the estimation results are very similar for all variables except for the behavioral model variables.
Only the latter are therefore reported in Table 6, with the naï ve approach as the omitted category.
The results for block-rate pricing, GDP per capita, and long vs. short run and segment vs.
point elasticities conform to those reported in Table 5.  Table 6 shows that the more sophisticated
behavioral approaches, such as the conditional approaches and the discrete-continuous approach,
increase the absolute value of both price and income elasticities.  Subsequent F-tests on the
restriction that the estimated coefficients of the four (sophisticated) approaches are the same, is
rejected for price elasticities (p < .01) but not rejected for income elasticities (p = .69). In addition,
in the case of price elasticities F-t sts on the behavioral approaches having the same effect are
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accepted for all pairwise comparisons, except for those with the discrete-continuous approach (all p-
levels < .05).  In sum, the discrete-continuous approach constitutes a noticeably different behavioral
modeling approach resulting in substantially greater price elasticities, but income elasticities based
on this approach cannot be discerned from those based on other modeling approaches.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing the literature on water demand modeling Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) describe a
“history” of the modeling of residential water demand.  They observe that studies focus on
determining the price elasticity of the demand for water instead of welfare implications, and the
functional specification is not discussed in the literature.  Moreover, most studies use straightforward
regression methods, applying them to either aggregate or disaggregate data, paying considerable
attention to different price specifications.  What is usually left unmodeled is t e choice of the block
in which consumers locate consumption.  Block-rate pricing results, however, in the budget
constraint to be piecewise linear.  Discrete- continuous models produce price elasticity estimates that
are much more elastic as compared to those that are based on more straightforward specifications.
The meta-analysis performed in this paper enables us to shed considerably more light on the
abovementioned differences.  The multivariate regression framework allows us to assess the
statistical significance of these characteristic differences, at the same time controlling for potential
intervening factors.  In addition, the analysis goes substantially beyond the Espey et al. (1997)
analysis.  First, the analysis is concerned with a much large sample of studies, and extends to income
elasticities.  Second, the newest and most sophisticated approach to modeling water demand (the
discrete-continuous approach) is included by means of three studies.  Finally, we account for
differences in income levels across studies by means of including information on GDP per capita.
We have taken special care in investigating the impact of microeconomic characteristics of
the underlying studies.  In sum, the main conclusions are as follows:
· It is of paramount importance to have accurate information about the existence of block rate
pricing.  Increasing block rate pricing makes residential water demand more elastic, whereas it
lowers income elasticities.  Decreasing block rate pricing on the contrary does not affect the
magnitude of the price and income elasticity.
· The use of prices different from marginal prices (i.e., flat, average, or Shin prices), controlling
for income differentials, the inclusion of a difference variable, and the use of the discrete-
continuous model enhances the absolute value of price and income elasticities.  There is,
however an important proviso: the effect of conditioning on income and the use of the discrete-
continuous model does not have a significant impact on income elasticities.  Phrased in terms of
the four behavioral models that we distinguished above: the discrete-continuous model
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significantly increases the elasticity of demand, whereas for income elasticities no significant
differences between the four approaches can be discerned.
· Segment price elasticities are substantially greater, and there is also some (although not very
robust) evidence that long run elasticities are larger in magnitude.
· It is crucial to account for income differences among studies.  We included GDP per capita to do
so, and find that the absolute magnitude of price and income elasticities is significantly greater
for areas/countries with higher incomes.
Although the attention for sustainability issues would lead one to expect that elasticities have
increased over time, this is not the case: there is no significant time trend in the elasticity values.
The geographical dimensions of variation are a lot less clear.  In the US elasticity values are rather
homogeneous, except for the arid West.  The elasticities in Europe are distinctly different from the
US, as well as the elasticities in other locations.  For both Europe and the West US, the results are
however not robust across different meta-samples.  It is therefore still unclear where (absolute)
elasticity values are highest.
In line with Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Espey et al. (1997) we conclude that
functional specification, aggregation level, data characteristics, and estimation issues are responsible
for significant differences among elasticity values.  At the same time, however, it becomes clear that
the direction and significance of these effects are not yet very robust.  On the one hand this is due to
a still rather limited number of observations, in particular for income elasticities, but on the other, it
is inherent to an analysis that is largely based on fixed effects.
There are two particularly promising avenues for future research that would substantially
enhance our knowledge of residential water demand.  One is further research into the theoretical and
empirical implications of discrete-continuous choice modeling, because the behavioral assumptions
on which we ground our research are of paramount importance for the magnitude of estimated
elasticity values, in particular price elasticities.  The other area of investigation pertains to what is
called “benefit transfer” (Brouwer 2000, gives an interesting overview).  It refers to the application
of values for sites/locations that have been studied, to unstudied sites/locations.  Many observations
in our database are concerned with the US, and it would hence be interesting to see how well these
values can be explained by locational characteristics, such as GDP per capita, population density,
and climatological conditions.  Although persistent problems would still need solving, such an
investigation could lead to an insightful map of elasticities of residential water demand in the US.
Above and beyond this, additional primary research remains highly valuable in view of increasing
the robustness of our knowledge about residential water demand.
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FIGURE 1
BUDGET RESTRICTION WITH AN INCREASING BLOCK RATE TARIFF AND ISO-UTILITY CURVES FOR THREE CONSUMERS
(A, B AND C) WITH DIFFERENT TASTES FOR WATER
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FIGURE 2A
WATER DEMAND AND PRICE ELASTICITY: CONSTANT BLOCK RATE PRICING
FIGURE 2B
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FIGURE 2C(1)
WATER DEMAND AND PRICE ELASTICITY: DECREASING BLOCK RATE PRICING ( 1)1()1( xab bb ->- )
FIGURE 2C(2)
WATER DEMAND AND PRICE ELASTICITY: DECREASING BLOCK RATE PRICING ( 1)1()1( xab bb -=- )
FIGURE 2C(3)
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FIGURE 3
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES,
ORDERED IN META-SAMPLE QUINTILES ACCORDING TO SIZE
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
sample 
quintiles
e p,y
income elasticity
price elasticity
33
FIGURE 4
PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES PLOTTED AGAINST SAMPLE SIZE (LOGARITHMIC Y-AXIS)
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TABLE 1A:
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES WITH PRICE ELASTICITIES OF RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMANDa
Reference Publ.Location Period Elasticity
(range)
Run Price TariffMethod Spec. EstimatorData # obs. Meta
obs.
DV DC LevelFreq.SeasonSeries
Wong (1972) LE Chicago, IL, US51-61 -.82, -.02S F F + - dlog OLS A A S, W C, T 11-40 6
Schefter & David (1985)LE Wisconsin, US 79 -.13, -.11S M na + - lin OLS A A S, W C 131 5
Chicoine & Ramamurthy (1986)LE Illinois, US 83 -.47 S M na - - lin OLS H M S, W P 681 1
Nieswiadomy & Molina (1989)LE Denton, TX, US76-80, 81-
85
-.86, 3.50S M D, I + - lin OLS, oth H M S P 2702-
3256
6
Nieswiadomy & Molina (1991)LE Denton, TX, US76-80, 81-
85
-.94, .78S Sh D, I - - dlog OLS, oth H M S P 2702-
3256
4
Hewitt & Hanemann (1995) LE Denton, TX, US 81-85 -1.59 S M I + + dlog oth H M S P 1703 1
Hanson (1996) LE Copenhagen,
Denmark
81-90 -.10, .00S F F - - dlog, lin OLS A A S, W T 30 4
Dandy et al. (1997) LE Adeline, Australia78-92 -.86, -.29L M na - - lin OLS H M S, W P 2710 6
Gibbs (1978) WRR Miami, FL, US 73 -.51, -.62S A, M D - - slog OLS H M S, W P 1412 2
Agthe & Billings (1980)WRR Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 -2.23, -.18S,L M I + - dlog, lin OLS, oth A M S, W T 45 9
Howe (1982) WRR US 63-65 -.57, -.06S M I + - lin oth H D S, W, YC 10-21 3
Renwick (1996) PhD California, US 85-90 -.33 S M I + - sys oth A M S,W P 119 1
Jones & Morris (1984)WRR Denver, CO, US 76 -.34, -.07S A, M na +/- - log, lin OLS, oth H A S,W C 326 1
Chicoine et al. (1986)WRR Illinois, US 82 -.42, -.22S M, Sh D + - lin OLS, oth H M S,W P 641 5
Nieswiadomy (1992) WRR US 84 -.60, .02S M, A, Sh na - - dlog OLS A M S,W P 42-86 12
Lyman (1992) WRR Moscow, ID, US 83-87 -3.33, -.40S,L M na - - dlog OLS H M S, W, Y P 240-656 16
Corral et al. (1998) unp California, US 82-92 -.30, .00S M na - - lin OLS H M S,W P 77-130 7
Billings & Agthe (1980) LE Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 -.61, -.27S M I + - lin, dlog OLS A M S, W T 45 1
Foster & Beattie (1981)LE US 60 -.13, -.12S A, M I +/- - dlog OLS A A S, W C 218 1
Billings (1982) LE Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 -.66, -.27S M I + - lin, dlog OLS A M S,W T 45 5
Foster & Beattie (1979)LE US 60 -.76, -.27S A na - - dlog OLS H A S, W C 12-97 6
Hewitt (1993) PhD Denton, TX, US 81-85 -1.23, -1.12S M I + + dlog oth H M S, W P 1703 1
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TABLE 1A CONTN’D.
Reference Publ.Location Period Elasticity
(range)
Run Price TariffMethod Spec. EstimatorData # obs. Meta
obs.
DV DC LevelFreq.SeasonSeries
Al-Qunaibet & Johnston (1985)WRR Kuwait 73-81 -.98, -.77S F F - - log,
flex, lin
OLS A A S, W T 96 6
Carver & Boland (1980)WRR Washington DC, US69-73 -.70, -.02S,L F F - - lin OLS, oth A M S, W P 373 9
Martin & Kulakowski (1991)WRR Tucson, AZ, US 65-88 -7.47, 7.90S M I - - seg na A A S, W T 1 18
Danielson (1979) WRR Raleigh, NC, US69-70 -.31, -.27S F na - - dlog oth H M W, Y P 262 2
Young (1973) WRR Tucson, AZ, US46-64, 65-
71
-.65, -.41S A na - - lin, dlog OLS A A S, W T 7-20 4
Howe & Linaweaver (1967)WRR US 61-66 -.23, -.21S A na - - lin, dlog OLS H A S, W C 197 3
Hanke & de Mare (1982)WRB Malmö, Sweden 71-78 -.15 S F na - - lin OLS A M S, W P 959 1
Moncur (1987) WRR County of Honolulu,
HI, US
77-85 -.68, -.03S,L M na - - lin OLS H M S, W P 46116-
53802
8
Hogarty & Mackay (1975)WRR Oak Manor,
Blacksburg, VA, US
71-72 -1.41, 0.09S M na - - seg na H M S, W P 24-54 8
Rietveld et al. (1997)disc Central Java,
Indonesia
94 -1.20, .82S M I + +/- dlog OLS, oth H M S, W C 220 1
Williams & Suh (1986) AE US 76 -.48, -.18S A, M na - - dlog OLS A A S, W C 86 1
Williams (1985) JUE US 70 -.62, -.22S A, M na - - dlog OLS A M S, W P 5-78 20
Nieswiadomy & Cobb (1993)CPI US 84 -.64, -.17S A, M D, I - - dlog OLS, oth A M S, W P 516-792 12
Martin & Wilder (1992)PFQ Columbia, SC, US80-81 -.70, -.32S A, M na - - dlog OLS, oth A M S, W P 83000 4
Conley (1967) ARS US 55 -.35 S A na - - dlog OLS A A S, W C 14 1
Billings (1990) JWR
PM
Tucson, AZ, US 74-80 -.72, -.57S A na - - lin, dlog OLS A M S, W P 84 1
Schneider & Whitlach (1991)JWR
PM
Columbus, OH ,US59-77 -.44, -.11S,L M D - - lin oth A M S, W P 18 1
Hansen & Narayanan (1981)WRB Salt Lake City, UT,
US
61-77 -.51, -.47S M na - - dlog OLS, oth A D S, W T 204 4
Stevens et al.  (1992)WRB Massachusetts, US88 -.69, -.10S A F, D, I- - lin OLS, oth A A S, W C 17-42 1
Cassuto & Ryan (1979)WRB Oakland, CA, US70-75 -.30, -.14S M na - - lin OLS, oth A M S, W P 17712 2
Gottlieb (1963) LE Kansas, US 52-57 -1.24, -.66S A na - - dlog OLS A A S, W C 19-24 3
Agthe et al. (1986) WRR Tucson, AZ, US 74-80 -.62, -.27S,L M na, I + - lin oth A M S, W T 48-84 4
Nauges & Thomas (2000)LE France 88-93 -.22 S A na - - lin oth A A S,W P 168 1
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TABLE 1A CONTN’D.
Reference Publ.Location Period Elasticity
(range)
Run Price TariffMethod Spec. EstimatorData # obs. Meta
obs.
DV DC LevelFreq.SeasonSeries
Point (1993) RE France 75 -.17 S A na - - dlog OLS A A S,W C 62 1
Hoglund (1999) WRR Sweden 80-92 -.27, .02L A,M na - - dlog OLS, oth A A S,W P 3190 14
Renwick, & Archibald (1998)LE California, US 85-90 -.53, -.11S,L M I + - sys oth H M S,W P 30-119 6
Griffin & Chang (1990)WRR Texas, US 81-86 -.38, -.16S A na - - lin OLS A D S,W P 1031 4
a See the footnote to Table 1B.
TABLE 1B
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES WITH INCOME ELASTICITIES OF RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMANDa
Reference Publ. Location Period Elasticity
(range)
Run Price TariffMethod Spec. EstimatorData #obs. Meta
obs.
DV DC LevelFreq.SeasonSeries
Wong (1972) LE Chicago, IL,US 51-61 .10, .58S F F - - dlog OLS A A S, W C, T 11-40 6
Schefter & David (1985)LE Wisconsin, US 79 .22, 2.39S M na + - lin OLS A A S, W C 131 5
Nieswiadomy & Molina (1989)LE Denton, TX, US 76-85 1.33, 2.77S M D, I + - lin OLS, oth H M S P 2702-3256 5
Nieswiadomy & Molina (1991)LE Denton, TX, US 76-85 .55, 7.83S S D, I - - dlog OLS, oth H M S P 2702-3256 4
Hewitt & Hanemann (1995)LE Denton, TX, US 81-85 .4 S M I + + dlog oth H M S P 1703 1
Darr et al. (1975) WRR Israel 70-71 .18, .60S na na - - dlog OLS H A S, W C 56-519 8
Gibbs (1978) WRR Miami, Fl, US 73 .14, .44S A, M D - - slog OLS H M S, W P 1412 2
Agthe & Billings (1980)WRR Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 -.16, .42S,L M I + - dlog, lin OLS A M S, W T 45 9
Jones & Morris (1984)WRR Denver, CO, US 76 .08, 1.68S M I + - log, lin oth H A S, W C 326 6
Chicoine et al. (1986)WRR Illinois, IL, US82 .46, 1.68S M D + - lin OLS, oth H M S, W P 641 3
Nieswiadomy (1992) WRR US 84 .15, 2.14S M, A, S na - - dlog OLS A M S, W P 86 12
Lyman (1992) WRR Moscow, ID, US 83-87 .02, .211S,L M na - - dlog OLS H D S P 240 3
Billings & Agthe (1980) LE Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 .06 S M I + - dlog OLS A M S, W T 45 1
Foster & Beattie (1981)LE US 60 -.01, .01S A, M I + - dlog OLS A A S, W C 218 2
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TABLE 1B CONTN’D.
Reference Publ. Location Period Elasticity
(range)
Ru
n
Price TariffMethod Spec. EstimatorData #obs. Meta
obs.
DV DC LevelFreq.SeasonSeries
Billings (1982) LE Tucson, AZ, US 74-77 .075 S A, M I + - dlog, lin OLS A M S, W T 45 2
Foster & Beattie (1979)LE US 60 0.32, 1.07S A na - - dlog OLS H A S, W C 12-97 6
Hewitt (1993) PhD Denton, TX, US 81-85 .43, 1.45S M I + + dlog oth H M S, W P 1703 6
Al-Qunaibet & Johnston (1985)WRR Kuwait 73-81 .40, 0.91S F F - - log,
flex, lin
OLS A M S, W T 96 6
Howe & Linaweaver (1967)WRR US 61-66 .00, .523S A na - - lin OLS A A S, W T 197 3
Hanke & de Mare (1982)WRB Malmö, Sweden 71-78 .376 S F F - - lin OLS A A S, W P 959 1
Moncur (1987) WRR County of Honolulu,
HI, US
77-85 .12, .41S M na - - lin OLS H M S, W P 46116-
53802
5
Hogarty & Mackay (1975)WRR Oak Manor,
Blacksburg, VA, US
71-72 -.86 S M na - - seg na H M S, W P 24 1
Rietveld et al. (1997)disc Central Java,
Indonesia
94 .05 S M I + + dlog oth H M S, W C 220 1
Williams & Suh (1986) AE US 76 .02, .192S A, M na - - dlog OLS A A S, W C 86 5
Williams (1985) JUE US 70 -.45, .67S A, M na - - dlog OLS A M S, W P 37-78 20
Nieswiadomy & Cobb (1993)CPI US 84 .13, .28S A, M D, I - - dlog OLS, oth A M S, W C 43-66 6
Nauges & Thomas (2000)LE France 88-93 .09 L A na - - lin oth A A S,W P 168 1
Hoglund (1993) WRR Sweden 80-92 .05, .49L A, M na - - dlog OLS, oth A A S,W P 3190 14
Renwick & Archibald (1998)LE California, US 85-90 .36 S M I + - sys oth H M S,W P 119 1
Griffin & Chang (1990)WRR Texas, US 81-86 .30,.48S A na - - lin OLS A D S,W P 1031 4
a The last column provides information about the number of elasticities included in the meta-analysis, sampled from the primary studies.
The meaning of the abbreviations in the respective columns, is as follows:
- Publication outlet, LE: Land Economics, WRR: Water Resources Research, WRB: Water Resources Bulletin, AE: Applied Economics, JUE: Journal of Urban Economics, CPI: C temporary Policy Issues, RE: Revue
Economique, PFQ: Public Finance Quarterly, ARS: Annals of Regional Science, JWRPM: Journal of Water Resource Planning and Management, PhD: dissert ion,
disc: discussion paper, unp: un ublished paper;
- Run, short-run (S) or long-run (L) elasticity;
- Price type, M: marginal price, A: average price, Sh Shin-price, F: fixed price, na: not ava lable;
- Tariff system, F: fixed rates, D: decreasing block rates, I: increasing block rates, na: not available;
- Method: Difference variable (DV) included (+) or not (-) in the water demand equation, and Discrete/Continuous approach (DC) applied (+) or not (-);
- Specification, dlog: double logarithmic, slog: semi-logarithmic, log: both double and semi logarithmic, lin: linear, sys: system of equations, seg: seg nt elas ic ty;
- Estimator, OLS: ordinary least squares, oth: other timation method;
- Data, aggregate (A) or household level (H) data, annual (A), monthly (M), or daily (D) data, winter (W), summer (S), or year-round (Y) data, time series (T), cross section (C), or panel (P) data.
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TABLE 2
ANOVA RESULTS FOR MAJOR MICROECONOMIC AND METHODOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMANDa
Comparison  from  Tariff system Price Long runSegmentConditionedDifferenceTwo-error
to  IncreasingDecreasingAverage Marginal Shin on incomevariable model
Price elasticities (N = 250)
Flat tariff system-.26** -.05
Increasing tariff system.21
Fixed price -.04 -.24** -.07
Average price -.20** .02
Marginal price .17
Short run -.15*
Point elasticity -.49***
Unconditioned .13
No difference variable -.02
No two-error model -.73***
Income elasticities (N = 148)
Flat tariff system.09 1.19***
Increasing tariff system1.10***
Fixed price -.16 .11 1.28***
Average price .27* 1.44***
Marginal price 1.17***
Short run -.34*
Point elasticity — b
Unconditioned -.07
No difference variable .24
No two-error model .16
a Significance is based on a two-sided t-test, and indicated by ***, ** and * for the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
b Omitted because there is only one segment income elasticity available.
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE REPLICATION OF THE ESPEY ET AL. (1997) ANALYSIS FOR THE ORIGINAL
AND THE EXTENDED SAMPLEa
Espey et al. sample Extended sample
“Original” Adjusted
Linear  Box-Cox Linear  Box-Cox Linear Box-Cox
Constant .68**
(2.60)
-1.05***
(-3.01)
.53
(1.32)
-.93**
(-2.18)
.06
(0.77)
-1.86***
(-7.06)
Increasing block rate 0.18
(1.57)
.39***
(2.67)
.22
(1.55)
.43***
(2.77)
.33***
(2.78)
.53***
(3.49)
Decreasing block rate .07
(.58)
.23
(1.61)
.07
(.05)
.33**
(2.13)
.10
(.72)
.27
(1.51)
Average price .59
(.96)
.18**
(2.26)
.18
(1.57)
.41***
(3.36)
-.04
(-.37)
.11
(.96)
Shin price 0.13
(1.36)
.30**
(2.41)
.21
(1.22)
.53***
(2.89)
-.10
(-.63)
-.01
(-.03)
Income -.48*
(-1.87)
-.15
(-.47)
.02
(.05)
-.93*
(-1.92)
-.18
(-1.18)
-.55***
(-2.92)
Difference variable included 1.29***
(6.91)
1.18***
(5.18)
.11
(.38)
-.48
(1.52)
-.20
(-1.47)
-.22
(-1.29)
Long run .34**
(2.28)
.39**
(2.14)
.54*
(3.0)
.42**
(2.22)
.21*
(1.95)
.41***
(3.00)
West US .03
(.27)
.20
(1.33)
.11
(.72)
.32*
(1.88)
.25**
(2.10)
.43***
(2.88)
East US .06
(.57)
.15
(1.25)
-.05
(-.37)
.07
(.50)
.09
(.76)
.24*
(1.68)
Loglinear specification .04
(.45)
.08
(.86)
.12
(1.04)
.17
(1.36)
.33***
(3.88)
.54***
(4.90)
Population density included .35**
(2.06)
.42**
(2.02)
-.06
(-.24)
-.16
(-.56)
.17
(1.02)
.33
(1.55)
Household size included .01
(.10)
.07
(.48)
-.05
(-.35)
-.17
(-1.22)
-.12
(-.97)
-.06
(-.40)
Seasonal dummy included -.20
(1.22)
0.05
(.23)
.52**
(2.32)
.57**
(2.36)
.18
(1.27)
.23
(1.26)
Evapotranspiration included -1.83***
(-9.31)
-1.52***
(-6.28)
-.74**
(-2.08)
-.15
(-.40)
-.29*
(-1.78)
-.16
(-.82)
Rainfall included -.62***
(-5.41)
-.43***
(-3.04)
.51*
(1.89)
.70**
(2.46)
-.152
(-1.48)
-.09
(-.68)
Temperature included .17*
(1.85)
-.22
(-.19)
-.65**
(-2.52)
-.97***
(-3.51)
-.14
(-1.34)
-.25*
(-1.94)
Lagged dependent variable .02
(.16)
.05
(.32)
.06
(-.24)
.04
(.18)
.14
(1.16)
-.07
(-.50)
Commercial use .43***
(2.69)
.58***
(2.95)
-.86*
(-1.84)
-1.18**
(-2.37)
.09
(.41)
.17
(.60)
Other estimation techniques .04
(.64)
0.03
(0.42)
.000
(.004)
.12
(1.08)
-.01
(-.11)
-.06
(-.53)
Daily data -.14
(-.83)
-.91
(-.44)
-.67*
(-1.89)
-.65*
(-1.73)
.37*
(1.91)
.80***
(3.22)
Monthly data .49***
(2.87)
.48**
(2.33)
-.30
(-.81)
.54
(1.28)
.40***
(2.80)
.93***
(4.97)
Household level data -.06
(-.47)
-.18
(-1.22)
-.37**
(-2.09)
-.55***
(-2.88)
.12
(1.17)
.10
(.81)
Cross section data .08
(.84)
.52
(.46)
-.21
(-.57)
.61
(1.44)
.18
(1.17)
.54***
(2.74)
Winter data -0.59***
(-4.90)
-.34**
(-2.23)
-.004
(-.01)
.11
(.40)
-.30
(-1.52)
-.27
(-1.09)
Summer data 1.67***
(14.67)
1.44***
(10.35)
1.31***
(5.65)
1.22***
(4.96)
.46***
(2.88)
.48**
(2.36)
R2-adj .81 .46 .23
F-test 21.83*** 5.25*** 4.01***
l 0.49***
(5.93)
0.12*
(1.91)
0.23***
(6.32)
LR test 41.06*** 160.74*** 280.11***
Log Likelihood 23.62 -15.05 -40.41 -61.51 -153.41 -225.89
Akaike Info. Crt. .04 .66 1.08 1.41 1.44 2.02
Log Amemiya Prob. Crt. -2.80 -2.41 -1.76 -1.65 -1.40 -.93
N 124 124 124 124 250 250
a Significance is based on a two-sided t-test (with t-value  in parentheses), and indicated by ***, ** and * for the 1, 5 and
10 percent level, respectively.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES BASED ON A LINEAR SPECIFICATION WITH
HETEROSCEDASTICITY CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
Price elasticity Income elasticity
Full Restricted Full Restricted
Constant 7.81
(.62)
.26
(1.35)
-79.32
(-1.45)
1.65**
(2.54)
Increasing block rate -.07
(-.04)
-.09
(-1.03)
.05
(.09)
.20
(.40)
Decreasing block rate -.04
(-.29)
-.09
(-1.14)
.93
(1.03)
1.01
(1.35)
No block rate info available -.12
(-1.00)
-.12*
(-1.84)
-.49
(-1.30)
-.31**
(-2.17)
Average price -.14***
(-2.97)
-.11***
(-2.87)
-.05
(-.50)
-.08
(-.81)
Shin price -.01
(-.08)
-.03
(-0.31)
.09
(.23)
.33
(.75)
Income included -.17
(-.91)
-.13
(-1.16)
-.70
(-.84)
-1.47***
(-4.39)
Difference variable included .07
(.66)
.13*
(1.73)
-.54
(-1.07)
-.46
(-.91)
Discrete-continuous model -1.17***
(-5.62)
-1.22***
(-7.00)
-1.50***
(-4.03)
-1.16***
(-5.10)
Long run -.28*
(-1.80)
-.36***
(-3.21)
-.09
(-.45)
-.08
(-.73)
Segment elasticity -.75**
(-2.37)
-.69**
(-2.59)
GDP per capita (× 1,000) -.01
(-.77)
-.02**
(-2.37)
-.01
(-.26)
-.02
(-.86)
West US -.13
(-1.60)
-.16***
(-2.84)
.06
(.31)
East US -.02
(-.27)
.09
(.50)
Europe .37***
(-2.34)
.21**
(2.27)
-.95
(-1.51)
-.76**
(-2.28)
Other locations -.14
(-.73)
.13
(.32)
Midpoint time period -.004
(-.60)
.04
(1.45)
Loglinear specification -.18**
(-2.86)
-.17***
(-2.83)
.22
(1.28)
Population density included -.09
(-.92)
-.02
(-.06)
Household size included -.08
(-1.00)
-.38
(-1.13)
Seasonal dummy included -.44*
(-1.89)
-.48**
(-2.43)
-1.44
(-1.49)
-1.40*
(-1.93)
Evapotranspiration included .30*
(1.79)
.41***
(3.06)
.77
(1.41)
1.24***
(4.21)
Rainfall included -.01
(-.06)
.14
(.50)
Temperature included .19***
(2.83)
.17***
(3.55)
-.18
(-.68)
Lagged dependent variable -.06
(-.46)
-.13
(-.91)
Commercial use -.05
(-.28)
-.04
(-.10)
Other estimation techniques -.02
(-.21)
-.28
(-.87)
Daily data -.03
(-.27)
-1.30**
(-2.33)
-.69**
(-2.07)
Monthly data -.36***
(-3.29)
-.48***
(-5.14)
-.89
(-1.47)
-.69*
(-1.98)
Household level data .04
(.53)
.21
(.64)
Cross section data .11
(.97)
.24
(.79)
.70*
(2.63)
Panel data .49***
(3.60)
.50***
(5.09)
1.02**
(2.00)
1.45***
(5.42)
Winter data .07
(.58)
.94
(1.31)
.62**
(2.04)
Summer data -.76***
(-3.58)
-.79***
(-4.48)
.22
(.36)
Unpublished studies .11
(1.10)
.13*
(1.65)
.78
(1.32)
.48***
(2.99)
R2-adj .35 .38 .38 .41
F test 4.95*** 8.18*** 3.70*** 6.47***
Log Likelihood -127.30 -129.41 -124.40 -128.44
Akaike Info. Crt. 1.30 1.21 2.14 2.00
Log Amemiya Prob. Crt. -1.54 -1.63 -.69 -.83
N 250 250 148 148
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES BASED ON A LINEAR SPECIFICATION WITH
HETEROSCEDASTICITY CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS FOR A SUBSAMPLE FOR WHICH INFORMATION ON THE
TARIFF STRUCTURE IS AVAILABLE
Price elasticity Income elasticity
Full Restricted Restricted
Constant -90.28***
(-2.91)
-67.74***
(-3.96)
-1.24**
(-2.45)
Increasing block rate -.17
(-1.64)
-.12*
(-1.70)
-.51***
(-3.08)
Decreasing block rate -.11
(-.93)
-.07
(-.74)
.51
(1.45)
Average  price -.24***
(-3.56)
-.24***
(-3.76)
.49*
(1.83)
Shin price -.10
(-1.13)
-.15**
(-2.04)
2.96**
(2.30)
Income -1.23**
(-2.15)
-1.02**
(-2.41)
.23
(1.20)
Difference variable included -.10
(-.82)
-.16
(-1.53)
.93***
(3.26)
Discrete-continuous model -1.10***
(-5.35)
-1.01***
(-10.67)
.03
(.14)
Long run -.02
(-.14)
-.08
(-.74)
-.06
(-.40)
Segment elasticity -2.21***
(-3.58)
-2.00***
(-4.54) —
GDP per capita (× 1,000) -.13***
(-3.25)
-.11***
(-4.69)
.07***
(2.79)
West US .63**
(2.54)
.43***
(3.82) —
East US .02
(.17) —
Europe -.85***
(-3.13)
-.70***
(-3.28) —
Other locations -.58***
(-2.74)
-.41***
(-2.18) —
Midpoint time period .05***
(2.92)
.04***
(3.95) —
Loglinear specification .09
(1.20) —
Population density included .34
(1.60)
.23**
(2.59) —
Household size included -.66**
(-2.08)
-.50***
(-4.05) —
Seasonal dummy included -.48***
(-3.61)
-.43***
(-4.33) —
Evapotranspiration included -.08
(-.65) —
Rainfall included -.10
(-.61) —
Temperature included .09
(1.18) —
Lagged dependent variable -.08
(-.47) —
Commercial use .55**
(2.50)
.24*
(1.84) —
Other estimation techniques -.12
(-1.19) —
Daily data .06
(.26) —
Monthly data -1.35***
(-3.53)
-1.25***
(-4.71) —
Household level data .15
(1.2)
.14**
(2.00) —
Cross section data -.33**
(-2.49)
-.36***
(-2.85) —
Panel data 1.32***
(2.88)
1.06***
(4.44) —
Winter data .16
(1.22) —
Summer data -.28***
(-2.65)
-.37***
(-4.91) —
Unpublished studies .07
(.62) —
R2-adj. .24 .29 .42
F test 2.14*** 3.21*** 6.40***
Log Likelihood -51.57 -53.15 -78.25
Akaike Info. Crt. 1.39 1.25 2.63
LogAmemiya Prob. Crt. -1.43 -1.57 -.20
N 123 123 67
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TABLE 6
(PARTIAL) ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES BASED ON A LINEAR SPECIFICATION WITH
HETEROSCEDASTICITY CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS FOR A SUBSAMPLE FOR WHICH INFORMATION ON THE
TARIFF STRUCTURE IS AVAILABLE AND FOUR DIFFERENT BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES
Price elasticity Income elasticity
Full Restricted Restricted
Constant -91.01***
(-2.95)
-67.59***
(-3.94)
-1.45*
(-1.93)
Increasing block rate -.18*
(-1.79)
-.13*
(-1.73)
-.56***
(-2.81)
Decreasing block rate -.12
(-1.09)
-.08
(-.89)
.36
(1.00)
Conditional income approach with average/fixed price -1.22**
(-2.11)
-1.02**
(-2.40)
.49*
(1.68)
Conditional income approach with marginal/Shin price -1.03*
(-1.83)
-.85*
(-1.95)
1.23*
(1.75)
Corrected conditional income approach -1.07*
(-1.88)
-.92**
(-2.19)
.88***
(2.74)
Discrete-continuous choice approach -2.16***
(-3.52)
-1.91***
(-4.44)
.83***
(3.18)
Long run -.02
(-.12)
-.08
(-.74)
.01
(.07)
Segment elasticity -2.16***
(-3.44)
-1.94***
(-4.36)
GDP per capita (× 1,000) -.14***
(-3.27)
-.11***
(-4.62)
.11**
(2.64)
…a …
…
…
…
—
R2-adj. .24 .30 .17
F test 2.22*** 3.35*** 2.72**
Log Likelihood -51.70 -53.46 -90.98
Akaike Info. Crt. 1.38 1.24 2.98
LogAmemiya Prob. Crt. -1.45 -1.59 .15
N 123 123 67
a The specifications for price elasticities also contain several control variables.  Because the coefficients are
virtually identical to those presented in Table 5, they are not reported here.
